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I. INTRODUCTION
The continuing European debt crisis is a constant reminder that the
financial crisis is not over yet and that mismanagement at financial
institutions continues to threaten the stability of the financial markets.1 The
London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") scandal is just the latest
revelation that draws into question whether financial institutions and
investment firms will ever become transparent enough to prevent a similar
future financial crisis. 2 The role that qualified financial contracts played
during the financial crisis, including over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives
and repurchasing agreements, has become a particular concern. 3 Credit
Default Swaps ("CDSs") and Collateralized Debt Obligations ("CDOs") may
I See, e.g., Daniel Schdfer & James Shotter, UBS Takes Swift Action on Job Cuts, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0dlba8e4-2217-11e2-9ffd-00144feabdcO.html#axzz
2ApjY36BZ (arguing that UBS's investment bank has embroiled this bank in a number of
"misadventures," including big write-downs in the financial crisis and the largest unauthorized
trading loss in British history, as well as the LIBOR scandal); Daniel Schafer & Caroline
Binham, Barclays Faces US Fine of $470m, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/36759eba-22a9-11e2-938d-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2ApjY36BZ (arguing that Barclays is
trying to rebuild its reputation after a series of scandals including the manipulation of financial
markets); EUR. CENT. BANK, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW: JUNE 2012, at 7-11 (2012), available
at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview20l206en.pdf (describing bank
business models as challenges and key risk factors); INT'L MONETARY FUND [IMF], GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: THE QUEST FOR LASTING STABILITY 25-33 (Apr. 2012), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf (arguing that investor concerns
were reflected in weak bank equity prices and soaring CDS spreads for banks in countries with
the most affected sovereigns in Europe); Steven Erlanger, After High Note for Euro Plan, Discord
Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/world/europe/after-high-
note-for-ecb-plan-some-discord-emerges.html; Luke Baker, EU Says Mismanaged Greek Banks
Face "Revamp," REUTERS, July 23, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/
us-eu-greece-piraeus-idUSBRE86MOPO20120723; Miles Johnson, Former Bankia Chief Hits out
at His Party, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e03f6328-d73f-1lel-a378-
00144feabdcO.html#axzz2ApjY36BZ; Jonas Prager, The Financial Crisis of 2007/8: Misaligned
Incentives, Bank Mismanagement, and Troubling Policy Implications 3-8 (June 27, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2094662; RICHARD A. POSNER, A
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 75-117 (2009)
(arguing that it was "widely believed . . . that banks miscalculated the safety of the novel
financial instruments [derivatives]"); Komal Sri-Kumar, Europe Losing Battle Against Debt
Crisis, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/359a5950-d253-llel-abe7-
00144feabdcO.html#axzz27mC9lfOO; Ruth Sullivan, Quarterly Review: European Debt Crisis
Dampens Flows, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d606318e-e6fd-llel-
af33-00144feab49a.html#axzz27mC9lfOO.
2 See, e.g., Martin Wheatley, Managing Dir. of the Fin. Servs. Auth. [FSA], Speech: Pushing the
Reset Button on LIBOR (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/libraryl
communication/speeches/2012/0928-mw.shtml; Brooke Masters et al., Global Regulators Follow
UK's Libor Lead, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/448c26fc-0965-11e2-
a5a9-00144feabdcO.html#axzz27mC9lfOO; Hanna Kuchler & Brooke Masters, UK Promises to
Reform Libor, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/a6807516-0947-11e2-
a5a9-00144feabdcO.html#axzz27mC9lfOO; Brooke Masters, British Banks Body Bows out of
Libor, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/Ofbd9l3acc-071e-11e2-92ef-
00144feabdcO.html.
3 See, e.g., DARRELL DUFFIE ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 424, POLICY
PERSPECTIVES ON OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2010), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr424.pdf.
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have had some of the most prominent roles during the meltdown, triggering
counterparties' defaults and runs on collateral posted as security for these
agreements. 4 Derivatives remain important financial instruments of
international finance and were only one cause for the financial crisis. 5
Regardless, credit derivatives played a significant role during the crisis in
allowing the excessive accumulation of leverage by financial and non-
financial institutions, which, in turn, required public-funded bailouts. 6
The European Union ("EU") has taken many legislative initiatives to
reduce the risk and limit the effects of any future financial crisis.7 Perhaps
the most important initiative is the European Commission's recent proposal
for a directive establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of
credit institutions and investment firms.8 The proposal attempts to further
harmonize EU insolvency regimes by establishing a Union-wide set of
uniform resolution tools and powers for financial institutions.9 The proposal
may not achieve all of its goals, however. It expands new safe harbor
protections for derivative transactions and central counterparties ("CCPs"),
shifting the systemic risk associated with derivatives from banks and
investment firms to clearing houses. 10 As noted, financial contracts, including
derivatives and repurchase agreements, will continue to play an important
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARv. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6
(2011); MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 195-211 (2d ed. 2011). Warren Buffet has
described derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while
now latent, are potentially lethal." See Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd.,
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 15 (Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf.
5 See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC Derivatives,
Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, at 11, COM (2010) 484 final (Sept. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Commission Staff Working Document], available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/20100915 impact-assessment en.pdf- see
also THE DE LAROSIERE GRP., THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU 25
(2009) [hereinafter DE LAROSItRE], available at http://ec.europa.eulinternal-market/finances/
docs/delarosierejreport en.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Kennetth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts, 35 J. CORP. L. 469,
470 (2010) (citing Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner noting that there was no alternative to bailing out Lehman Brothers and AIG in the
middle of a financial crisis).
Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 23-24 (describing the AIG bail out); see
also Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment
Firms and Amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC,
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/ EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU)
No. 1093/2010, COM (2012) 280 final (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal for Bank
Resolution].
5 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7.
9 Id. at 4.
10 See infra Part III. C.
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role in international finance." At the same time, certain CDS contracts may
not have been made if appropriate risk assessment had been conducted in the
first place. 12 Some of the riskiest and most questionable credit derivatives
were synthetic CDOs tied to CDS contract pooling. 13 It seems clear today that
part of the initial problem and the resulting culture of credit derivatives
misuse were fostered by the financial industry's focus on pricing risk in the
financial system, rather than prohibiting or restricting that risk. 14
This Article argues that safe harbors for financial contracts should not be
expanded in Europe, but instead should be repealed, as suggested by some
commentators in the United States. 15 At the very minimum, credit
derivatives, swaps, and repurchasing agreements should be subject to a stay,
and the resolution authorities in the Member States should have the power to
assume beneficial contracts and to reject other unfavorable contracts. Also,
the power of resolution authorities to transfer derivative positions in full or in
part should not be sanctioned in favor of a full transfer.'6 Rather, resolution
authorities should have the power to cherry pick individual contracts for
transfers after determining any potential systemic risk involved. In addition,
it is essential to grant resolution authorities clear avoidance powers,
specifically the power to avoid preferential transfer prior to bankruptcy. A
pre-bankruptcy transfer could be exempted if made "in the ordinary course of
business."1 7 Without the extension of the avoidance powers, counterparties
will simply move for contract termination, set off, and close-out at a time
prior to bankruptcy.18
11 DUFFIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
12 See, e.g., DURBIN, supra note 4, at 213-17.
13 Id. at 206-10; see also JOHN-PETER CASTAGNINO, DERIVATIVES: THE KEY PRINCIPLES 1 4.172
(3d ed. 2009); see also GEORGE CRAWFORD & BUDYUT SEN, DERIVATIVES FOR DECISION MAKERS:
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ISSUES 112 (1996).
14 See, e.g., Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, & Vasileios Madouros, Economist,
Bank of Eng., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's 36th Economic Policy
Symposium: The Changing Policy Landscape, The Dog and Frisbee 22 (Aug. 31, 2012), available
at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech596.pdf
(arguing in favor of a less complex and less complicated regulatory landscape for capital
requirements of financial institutions).
15 See, e.g., Bryan G. Faubus, Note, Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for Derivatives to
Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801 (2010); see also Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 at the
Crossroads: Does Reorganization Need Reform?: Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 319 (2010) [hereinafter Lubben, Crossroads].
16 See infra Part III.A.2.a.
7 The U.S. approach may serve as an important starting point in this context. See, e.g., CHARLES
JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 489 (2d ed. 2009); see also Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 756-60 (1984) [hereinafter Jackson, Avoiding
Powers].
18 See infra note 56 and accompanying text; see also Jens-Hinrich Binder, Bankenintervention
und Bankenabwicklung in Deutschland: Reformnotwendigkeiten und Grundzilge eines
verbesserten Rechtsrahmens 17-18 (Sachverstandigenrates zur Begutachtung der
Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Working Paper No. 05/2009, 2009) (Ger.), available at
84 [Vol. 22:81
EUROPEAN UNION: STATUS Quo OF SAFE HARBORS
The threat of bankruptcy for credit derivative positions advocated here
may function as an important incentive for counterparties to properly assess
the risk associated with CDS contracts. 19 If done properly, a run on collateral
posted in the context of credit derivative positions should never commence,
leaving a distressed financial institution with a sufficient going concern
surplus for reorganization and avoiding liquidation. Specifically, the
protection of creditors' rights and the principle of equitable disbursement of
assets pari pasu in bankruptcy may function as enforcement mechanisms for
this incentive. More importantly, the threat of bankruptcy as an incentive for
more effective risk management may also work in tandem with the clearing
obligation under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation ("EMIR").20
On the one hand, it may provide an incentive to clear OTC derivatives
through a CCP, and on the other, it may also secure the financial stability of
a CCP by developing a multilevel assessment of risk associated with credit
derivatives.
The first part of this Article briefly examines the concepts of OTC
derivatives and CDSs. It also discusses safe harbors as a special treatment of
derivatives under bankruptcy and provides an overview of the EMIR. The
second part reviews the most recent European Commission proposal for a
directive establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms and discusses the relevance of this
proposal for derivatives and clearing of standardized OTC derivatives under
the EMIR.
II. OTC DERIVATIVES AND CENTRAL CLEARING
A. Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps
1. General Remarks
The reliance on OTC derivatives and CDSs has become a significant focus
of attention since the financial crisis. 21 Following the failure of Lehman
Brothers and the bail-out of American International Group ("AIG") in the
United States, it became clear that CDSs pose a significant threat to global
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/Arbeitspapiere/
BankeninterventionundBankenabwicklung-inDeutschland.pdf (arguing that this is already
the case and most default clauses in derivative contracts are structured to allow for pre-
bankruptcy termination); see also Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 16.
19 See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Safe Harbors for Derivatives vs. Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK, Jan. 11, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/derivative-safe-harbors-vs-
chapter-I/ [hereinafter Lubben, Safe Harbors].
2o Council Regulation 648/2012, art. 48(5)-(6), 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 [hereinafter EMIR], available
at http://eurlex.europa.eufLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:201:0001:0059:EN:PDF.
21 See generally Steven Lofchie et al., No Crisis Wasted: Proposed EU and U.S. Regulation of
OTC Derivatives (Part I), BLOOMBERG L. REP., Nov. 15, 2010, at 1.
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financial markets. 22 At best, financial institutions investing in CDSs did so
with utter disregard of the risk involved; at worst, they simply did not
understand the complex nature of these agreements. 23
It became apparent that, as highly customized, privately negotiated
contracts, OTC derivatives and credit derivative markets are opaque and lack
transparency. 24 The resulting lack of information made it difficult, if not
nearly impossible, for regulators to accurately assess the systemic risk
associated with these instruments.25 In 2009, the G20 leaders agreed that, by
the end of 2012, all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be cleared
through a CCP and reported to trade repositories. The goal was to improve
transparency and regulatory oversight of derivative markets in an
internationally consistent manner. 26 While some countries, such as
Singapore, seemed to back away from this commitment, 27 the EU enacted the
EMIR in early July 2012, which requires central clearing and reporting of
22 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 13; see also Paul Kiel, AIG's Spiral
Downward: A Timeline, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.propublica.org/article/article-
aigs-downward-spiral-1114 (suggesting that AIG's failure was largely due to its exposure to
CDSs); see Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Resolution of Financial Distress, in
THE CREDIT DERIVATIVE HANDBOOK 47-56 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Paul U. Ali eds., 2008);
Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 405
(2007); Lubben, Crossroads, supra note 15, at 319-21.
23 The losses caused by a trading fiasco at J.P. Morgan's London office is just the latest example.
See Tom Braithwaite, JPMorgan's 'Whale' Loss Swells to $5.8bn, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 2012,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cba50lOa-ccd8-1lel-b78b-00144feabdcO.html; Shannon D. Harrington
et al., Ex-JP Morgan Trader Feldstein Wins in Betting Against Bank, BLOOMBERG, July 3, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-02/ex-jpmorgan-trader-feldstein-biggest-winner-
betting-against-bank.html.
24 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 11-13; see also Stout, supra note 4, at
1-3.
25 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Low, 2012
WIs. L. REV. 815, 818 (2012) (arguing that complexity was the main reason for financial
information failure); see also Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (2011) (analyzing the
potential of regulation to make the financial system more resilient to risk); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk); see generally Sanford J.
Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM.
EcoN. REV. 393 (1980).
26 FIN. STABILITY BD. [FSB], OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: THIRD PROGRESS REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION 1-5 (2012), available at http://www.chathamfinancial.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/06/FSB-OTCD-Working-Group-Report-6-15-2012_Appl.pdf.
27 See MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., PROPOSED REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES 23 (2012),
available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/resource/publications/consult-papers/2012/13%20
February%202012%2OProposed%2ORegulation%20of%200TC%2ODerivatives.pdf; see also HUA
ZHANG, OTC DERIVATIVES AND TRADING PLATFORMS IN SINGAPORE 4-5 (2012), available at
http://www.celent.com/reports/otc-derivatives-and-trading-platforms-singapore; Jeremy Grant,
Singapore Diverges on OTC Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/
0/5e9b544e-566b-1 lel-a328-00144feabdcO.html.
86 [Vol. 22:81
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derivatives. 28 The United States did so two years earlier under the Dodd-
Frank Act. 29
Derivatives are important and necessary tools in international finance.
They are legitimately used for risk management, investment, and many other
trading purposes. 30 Derivatives can range from those fully standardized to
those that are customized to the specific needs of a particular counterparty.
Fully standardized derivatives, such as many futures and options, are
typically already traded on exchanges, while the customized contracts are
traded bilaterally or over-the-counter. 3'
Generally, derivatives are simply agreements between a future buyer and
a future seller, or so-called counterparties. 32 These agreements can be
customized to each party's particular needs and derive their value from any
underlying reference item the counterparties wish to use. For example, sugar,
the weather, or any index or currency may be used as an underlying
variable. 33 Other examples may be interest rates, securities, stocks, or debt
obligations. To be more specific, currency derivatives derive their value from
underlying foreign exchange markets, equity derivatives from the underlying
stock markets, and interest derivatives may reference any underlying money
market. 34 In addition, while complex in nature, all derivative contracts are a
variation of only four basic agreement types: the forward, future, swap, or
options contract. 35 This Article focuses on CDSs and their role as OTC
derivative agreements. OTC derivatives are derivatives not traded on an
exchange but, instead, privately negotiated between counterparties. 36
28 EMIR, supra note 20, at 2.
29 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
30 See, e.g., CASTAGNINO, supra note 13, at 1-2; JOHN E. MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS: USES AND
ABUSES OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 1-2 (2d ed. 2009); DURBIN, supra note 4, at 71-83; PAUL C.
HARDING, A PRACTICE GUIDE TO THE 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 3 (2004);
CRAWFORD & SEN, supra note 13, at 3-5.
31 See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 12.
32 ANDREW CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FORWARDS,
FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 1 (2d ed. 2010).
3 MARTHINSEN, supra note 30, at 3.
3 HARDING, supra note 30, at 1.
35 See CHISHOLM, supra note 32, at 1-2.
36 Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Making Derivatives Markets in Europe Safer and More
Transparent, IP/10/1125 (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1125&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en; see also Press Release, Regulation on Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Market
Infrastructures-Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/12/232 (Mar. 29, 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/232.
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2. Credit Default Swaps
Credit Default Swaps were invented in the 1990s as an insurance
mechanism for commercial debt and corporate bonds, 37 and later extended to
include mortgage backed bonds. 38 At the end of 2008, the outstanding
notional amount of CDSs reached $38.6 trillion,39 and in the first quarter of
2009, the notional amount of derivatives held by U.S. commercial banks was
approximately $202 trillion, with $14.6 trillion in CDSs as the third largest
category of derivatives. 40 By the end of 2009, and as a direct reflection of the
reduction in market prices, the total gross market value fell by as much as a
third, to $21.6 trillion. 41 Since then, the CDS market continues to grow at a
moderate pace with a notional value of $26.3 trillion at mid-year 2010 and
remains the third largest category behind interest and foreign exchange
derivatives.42
In a CDS contract, creditworthiness is the underlying pricing mechanism,
effectively making credit risk a tradable product. Under a basic credit
derivative contract, a counterparty, in return for a premium payment,
promises to make a payment to the other counterparty if a third party or
bond issuer defaults on her debt obligation. 43 A CDS thus provides credit
default protection and compensates the protection buyer in case of loss or
default. Compensation may take place based on a settlement method
previously agreed upon by the counterparties. The protection seller may
either take physical delivery of the credit-impaired securities at a previously
agreed price, or he may instead pay in cash the difference between the price
and the securities' current market value.44
While similar to an insurance contract, 45 CDSs are different in that their
payout is independent from actual loss. 46 Settlement is due when a credit
event occurs, regardless of whether the protection buyer suffers or even risks
7 HARDING, supra note 30, at 3.
38 DURBIN, supra note 4, at 61.
3 Summaries of Market Survey Results, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N,
http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
40 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ADM'R OF NAT'L BANKS, OCC'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: FIRST QUARTER 2009 (2009).
41 See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 12.
42 Summaries of Market Survey Results, supra note 39.
4 See CASTAGNINO, supra note 13, at 86.
44 Oskari Juurikkala, Credit Default Swaps and Insurance: Against the Potts Opinion, 26 J. INT'L
BANKING L. & REG. 128, 135 (2011) (arguing that CDS contracts in some cases may be construed
as insurance contracts).
4 See, e.g., Arthur Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should Like Things Be
Treated Alike?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 241, 246-47 (2008).
46 HARDING, supra note 30, at 19; see also Lloyds & Scottish Fin. Ltd. v. Cyril Lord Carpets Sales
Ltd., [1992] B.C.L.C. 609.
[Vol. 22:8188
EUROPEAN UNION: STATUS Quo OF SAFE HARBORS
suffering a loss. 47 Moreover, the definitions of credit events triggering a
settlement are usually much broader than those in insurance contracts. 48 The
most common credit events triggering contract termination and settlement
are the potential failure to pay, bankruptcy, and restructuring.49 In order to
ensure the optimal level of protection, the typical termination clause
establishes default even before any formal bankruptcy or restructuring
proceedings are initiated.so For example, in the ISDA Master Agreement
(1992), which is the standard master agreement of most credit derivatives in
the United States and Europe, default is assumed if a reference entity
"makes a general assignment, arrangement or composition with or for the
benefit of its creditors" 5 1 or "seeks or becomes subject to the appointment of
an administrator, provisional liquidator, conservator, receiver, trustee,
custodian or other similar official for it or for all or substantially all its
assets." 52 This already very broad definition is further supplemented by a
catchall clause establishing a termination right if a party causes any event
that has an analogous or equivalent effect to bankruptcy.53
B. Special Insolvency Treatment of OTC Derivatives
1. Bankruptcy Basics
The bankruptcy codes of the United States5 4 and all EU Member States55
contain special exceptions for securities or market contracts.5 6 This now also
includes CCPs and clearing houses.57 Under these so-called safe harbors, the
general insolvency rules do not apply, an exception that may negatively affect
47 HARDING, supra note 30, at 19.
4s Id.
4 Id. at 6.
5o See, e.g., Int'l Swap Dealers Ass'n, Inc., Master Agreement, Wachovia Bank Nat'l. Ass'n and
Novastar Mortg. Supplemental Interest Trust, § 5(a)(vii)(3) (May 27, 2005) [hereinafter Master
Agreement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1328469/000119312505124580/
dex105.htm; HARDING, supra note 30, at 109; see also Binder, supra note 18, at 17-18. One
reason for these early termination rights is clearly to avoid any potential conflict with differing
national insolvency rules.
51 Master Agreement, supra note 50, § 5(a)(vii)(3).
52 Id. § 5(a)(vii)(6).
61 Id. § 5(a)(vii)(8).
54 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012).
55 Council Directive 2002/47, art. 7, 2002 O.J. (L 168) 43, 49 (EC).
56 The term securities and market contracts can be used synonymously with financial or qualified
financial contracts.
57 Council Directive 2002/47, supra note 55, art. 1.
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debtor and creditor protection.5 8 Before discussing these safe harbors in more
detail, it may be helpful to first provide the context in which they operate and
the rights that they exempt. Most important in this context is the stay, or the
temporary suspension, of any individual enforcement actions against the
bankruptcy estate. Of equal importance is the debtor's right to assume or
reject executory contracts (so-called "cherry picking") and the power to set
aside preferential transfers of property prior to the commencement of any
bankruptcy proceeding.
a. The Stay
One of the most important goals of any insolvency proceeding is to protect
the bankruptcy estate and to preserve a going concern surplus in
reorganization. 9 In this context, interim measures such as the automatic
stay under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code60 are essential tools to stop creditors'
collection actions immediately. 61 The stay serves only to provide interim
protection for creditors and the debtor during the pendency of the bankruptcy
case. 62 A grab race by creditors and the uncontrolled run on assets of the
debtor may prevent an orderly reorganization of liquidation. 63 Put differently,
in a U.S. context:
[T]he automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor
protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors . . . . The automatic
stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain
creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against
the debtor's property. Those who acted first would obtain
payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of
other creditors. 64
In the United Kingdom, a court may order a total or limited stay "at any
time after an order for a winding up, on the application either of the
liquidator or the official receiver or any creditor or contributory" order a total
58 ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, DOCUMENTATION FOR DERIVATIVES: ANNOTATED
SAMPLE AGREEMENTS AND CONFIRMATIONS FOR SWAPS AND OTHER OVER-THE-COUNTER
TRANSACTIONS 294 (4th ed. 2002).
59 Thomas H. Jackson, Chapter 11F: A Proposal for the Use of Bankruptcy to Resolve
(Restructure, Sell, or Liquidate) Financial Institutions, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE
KNOW THEM 217 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., 2009).
o 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
61 See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of
Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399 (1986) [hereinafter
Jackson, Of Liquidation].
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or limited stay. 65 In Germany, a court may order an interim measure if
necessary "to avoid any detriment to the financial status of the debtor."66
Additionally, in Germany a court may stay termination rights of all
obligations and contracts under the Financial Institution Reorganization
Act.6 7 The stay includes derivatives, swaps, and repurchasing agreements. 68
In Germany, the stay starts on the day of the petition for reorganization and
terminates at the end of the next business day. 69 Assuming the petition was
filed on a Friday, termination rights and close-out-netting may be stayed for
up to ninety-six hours in Germany. 70
Acting on its mandate from the G20,71 the Financial Stability Board
("FSB") 72 has endorsed the integral role of the stay for the resolution of
failing financial institutions. 73 The FSB concluded that counterparties of
derivative contracts should not generally be entitled "to exercise early
termination rights [against a financial institution in resolution] provided the
substantive obligations under the contract, including payment and delivery
65 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 147(1) (Eng.).
66 Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [German Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I
[BGBL. I] at 2866, as amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 20, 2011, BGBL. I at 2854, § 21 (1) (translation
by author).
67 Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten [KredReorG] [Financial Institution
Reorganization Act], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900 (Ger.).
68 See generally id.
69 See generally id.
7o Id. § 13 ("Schuldverhaltnisse mit dem Kreditinstitut kdnnen ab dem Tag der Anzeige nach § 7
Absatz 1 bis zum Ablauf des folgenden Geschaftstages im Sinne des § 1 Absatz 16b des
Kreditwesengesetzes nicht beendet werden. Eine Kiindigung gegeniber dem Kreditinstitut ist in
diesem Zeitraum ausgeschlossen. Die Wirkung sonstiger in diesem Zeitraum eintretender
Beendigungstatbestande ist bis zu seinem Ablauf aufgeschoben. Abweichende Vereinbarungen
sind unwirksam . . . ."); Gesetz fiber das Kreditwesen [KWG] [The German Banking Act], Sept. 9,
1998, BGBL. I at 2776, last amended by Gesetz [G], Nov. 6, 2012, BGBL. I at 2286, § 1, 16(b)
("Der Geschiiftstag eines Systems umfasst Tag- und Nachtabrechnungen und beinhaltet alle
Ereignisse innerhalb des fiblichen Geschliftszyklus eines Systems."); see also Christoph K.
Henkel & Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring, 32 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 191, 232 (2012).
71 Grp. of Twenty [G20], G20 Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit 13, (Sept. 24-25,
2009) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Summit], available at http://www.g20.org/1oad/780988012.
72 Financial Stability Board, FSB, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ (last visited Mar. 17,
2013). The FSB is an international body that has been established to coordinate the work of
national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies. Id. "The FSB develop[s]
and promote[s] the implementation of effective regulatory . . . [and] supervisory policies for the
financial sector." Id. Members of the FSB are national regulatory authorities, national and
international financial institutions, associations, committees, and experts in the financial sector.
Links to FSB Members, FSB, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2012).
73 FSB, KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 41
(2011) [hereinafter FSB, KEY ATTRIBUTES], available at http://www.financial
stabilityboard.org/publications/r 11104cc.pdf.
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obligations, and provision of collateral, continue to be performed." 74 At a
minimum, if early termination rights are deemed necessary, the FSB
suggested that a resolution authority should have the power to stay such
rights temporarily where they arise "by reason only of entry into resolution or
in connection with the use of resolution powers and provided that the
substantive obligations under the contract, including payment and delivery
obligations, and provision of collateral, continue to be performed."75 The FSB
did not express a preference over whether or not any stay may be imposed at
the discretion of the resolution authority on a "case-by-case" basis or made to
be automatic, leaving this choice to national legislators. 76 At the same time,
the FSB proposed limiting the power of imposing a temporary stay and
making it contingent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions:77 (1) the stay
may only apply to early terminations rights triggered by the "entry into
resolution or in connection with the use of resolution powers"; (2) "the stay is
strictly limited in time"; (3) the resolution authority is not allowed to "cherry-
pick"; (4) "[flor contracts that are transferred to a third party or bridge
institution, the acquiring entity would assume all the rights and obligations
at the firm from which the contracts were transferred"; (5) "early termination
rights of the counterparty are preserved against the firm in resolution in the
case of any default occurring before, during or after the period of stay"; (6) if
financial contracts are transferred, early termination rights of the
counterparty "are preserved against the acquiring entity" should there be a
subsequent, independent default; (7) "the counterparty can exercise the right
to close-out immediately against the firm in resolution on expiry of the stay
or earlier if the authorities inform the firm that the relevant contracts will
not be transferred"; and (8) early termination rights may be transferred, after
the period of the stay, for any contracts which were not transferred "to a
sound firm, bridge institution or other public entity." 78 The FSB further
proposed that any stay may not inhibit rights of counterparties with regard
to netting and collateralization agreements or "interfere with payment or
delivery obligations" of CCPs.79
b. The Right to Assume or Reject
There is no precise definition of what kind of contract qualifies as an
executory contract.80 In an executory contract, however, the obligations of
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 42.
n Id.
78 FSB, KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 73, at 42.
7 Id. at 41.
8 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963. For a broader
discussion on the importance of the right to assume or reject executory contracts, see Jay
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both parties generally are "so far unperformed that failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other."8 1 This means that executory contracts at the time
of bankruptcy are only those contracts that combine an asset with a
liability. 82 Derivative contracts and CDSs fall into this category and are
considered executory contracts. 83 For the bankruptcy estate, executory
contracts pose the problem that the property right in these contracts is
inevitably also tied to a liability. 84 The estate simply cannot acquire any
executory contractual property right without incurring a contractual
obligation at the same time. 85 To address this dilemma, a bankruptcy trustee
has the basic choice "subject to court approval" to either assume or reject any
executory contract.86 If the contract is assumed, the estate is obligated under
the contract and the claim of the creditor may receive a priority status. 87 By
rejecting the contract, on the other hand, the trustee or debtor in possession
will not receive the benefit of the contract and will thus not succeed to either
the asset or the liability represented by that contract.8 8 Rejection is also
considered a pre-petition breach, leaving the creditor only an unsecured claim
for damages without priority.89 In most cases, the decision on whether to
assume or reject the contract will depend on whether or not the obligation
will be beneficial for the debtor in bankruptcy. 90
Creditors and non-defaulting parties consider the choice of assumption
and rejection, known as cherry picking, to be unfair.91 Banks and investment
firms, in particular, consider this to be inequitable, because a debtor can
Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 231
(1989) (proposing to eliminate the threshold requirement of "executoriness" for these contracts).
81 Camp v. Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh (In re Gov't Sec. Corp.), 111 B.R. 1007, 1011
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)), aff'd, 972 F.2d 328 (11th Cir. 1992).
82 See, e.g., TABB, supra note 17, at 806.
83 See, e.g., Kevin Dolan & Carlyn DuPuy, Equity Derivatives: Principles and Practice, 15 VA. TAX
REV. 161, 164 (1995).
84 See TABB, supra note 17, at 802.
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). Generally the trustee has four basic choices. Not only can
he assume or reject, the trustee also has the right to assign the contract after assuming it or to
do nothing effectively putting any executory contract into limbo. Id. § 365. See also Copeland v.
Stephens, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B.).
87 See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel & Edward A. Friedler, The Limits on Assuming and Assigning
Executory Contracts, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 321 (2000).
88 See, e.g., TABB, supra note 17, at 809; see also Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico, 360 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1966).
8 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (2012).
9 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions, 46 DUKE L.J. 517
(1996).
91 See, e.g., Faubus, supra note 15, at 824.
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simply retain any favorable derivative contract and reject unfavorable
contracts. According to banks, this in turn may result in systemic risk.92 This
argument is hardly convincing, however. Under the safe harbor protection,
only non-defaulting counterparties want to be able to cherry pick, while at
the same time arguing that extending the same right to debtors would be
inequitable and not justified. 93 Yet, a de facto termination or set off under a
master agreement amounts to nothing more than a rejection of an executory
contract.
c. Preferences
Without a brief discussion of preference law, which is one of the most
important avoidance powers in bankruptcy, the discussion of rights affected
by safe harbors would not be complete. Under preference law, the trustee
may set aside preferential transfers made within a specified time prior to the
filing of bankruptcy. 94 A preference is an ex post transaction that favors one
creditor over another and need not be fraudulent.9 5 Bankruptcy serves to
collectively satisfy all creditors and to promote the fair and equitable
distribution of assets among them.9 6 Without preference law, this principle
would be disrupted and bankruptcy law would amount to nothing more than
a race for the debtor's assets.9 7 Creditors could simply utilize any pre-petition
informational advantage to grab assets that would otherwise automatically
become part of the estate. More importantly, preferential transfers usually
occur when the debtor knows or assumes that he is entering the vicinity of
insolvency.98 Now in financial distress, the debtor may choose to pay some of
92 See Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance
into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1059-60 (1994).
9 See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J.
123, 130 (2010) [hereinafter Lubben, Bankruptcy Code].
94 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) ("(4) made - (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the
filing of the petition."). According to German preference law,
[1]egal transactions on the part of the debtor constituting a direct
disadvantage to insolvency creditors may be contested if they were made
[(1)] during the last three months prior to the request to open insolvency
proceedings, if the debtor was illiquid on the date of such transaction, and if
the other party was aware of such insolvency on this date, or [(2)] subsequent
to the request to open insolvency proceedings, and if at the time when the
legal transaction was made the other party was aware of such insolvency or
of the request to open insolvency proceedings.
Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [German Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBl. I at 2866, § 132(1)
(translation by author); see also German Insolvency Act, § 239.
95 See, e.g., TABB, supra note 17, at 486-91; 1 COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION: BANKRUPTCY CODE
581 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2008) [hereinafter COLLIER].
96 See, e.g., Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 713, 748 (1985).
9 See, e.g., Jackson, Avoiding Powers, supra note 17, at 756-60.
98 See, e.g., TABB, supra note 17, at 488.
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his preferred creditors first, instead of satisfying all creditors pro rata.99
Some creditors may also have a better appreciation of a debtor's financial
situation than others and try to act expeditiously in order to secure their own
financial situation and avoid bankruptcy. 100 While U.S. law no longer focuses
on a "reasonable cause to believe" 1o1 and instead looks towards "unusual
action" 102 or "Opt out" 103 activities to determine whether any particular
transfer may be avoidable, some European insolvency regimes simply require
that the other party has been aware of an impending insolvency.104 At the
same time, some insolvency regimes, such as the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
include a presumption in favor of an existing preference if a transaction was
made during a "preference period," which is ninety days in the United
States. 105 It is clear that for many creditors, specifically counterparties to
derivatives and swaps, preference law is of major concern. If applied to
settlement agreements, "close-out" and "set off' before bankruptcy may
generally become impossible.
2. Safe Harbors
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code 106 and all EU Member State insolvency
regimes 107 contain special exceptions for securities or market contracts,
including credit derivatives and swap agreements.10 8 Under these so-called
safe harbors, the general insolvency rules do not apply.109 Bankruptcy filing
may ipso facto become an event of default allowing the immediate
termination, set off, or "close-out" of derivative contracts. 110 With the contract
99 Id.
10 Id.
101 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-178 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963.
102 Id. at 373.
103 See, e.g., Jackson, Avoiding Powers, supra note 17, at 759.
104 See, e.g., Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [German Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBl. I at 2866, §
132(1).
101 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2010). The preference period is one year in the United States if the
creditor was an insider. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
106 Id. § 362 (outlining the non-debtor derivative counterparty's right to terminate contracts to
seize collateral); id. §§ 555-56, §§ 559-61 (stipulating that existing contractual rights, including
ipso facto clauses, may be exercised by derivative counterparties).
10 Council Directive 2002/47, supra note 55.
10 The term securities and market contracts can be used synonymously with financial or
qualified financial contracts. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i) (giving the U.S. definition of
market contracts); Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 155 (giving the English definition of market
contracts).
109 GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 58.
110 Eleanor Heard Gilbane, Testing the Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbors in the Current Financial
Crisis, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 241, 243 (2010) (close-out and set-off are contractual
termination rights that may be exercised under ipso facto clauses during bankruptcy); David A.
Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Essay, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in
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terminated, little or nothing may be left for the bankruptcy trustee to
assume."1 Derivative contracts are also generally not subject to any stay,112
interim, 113 or interlocutory relief. 114 Even more significant, any collateral
collected immediately before a bankruptcy petition and following the
termination of a swap agreement can also not be attacked as a preference. 115
Moreover, neither the debtor nor the trustee retains any right to freely decide
whether to assume or reject a credit derivative or CDS. 116
The main reason for safe harbors, according to the financial industry, is
the prevention of cherry picking and avoiding systemic risk by maintaining
liquidity in the market. 117 It is argued that safe harbors are necessary to
allow for close-out netting, 118 which is the technical term for the enforcement
of ipso facto clauses in bankruptcy. 119 According to banks and investment
firms, the insolvency of any counterparty may trigger a chain reaction of
insolvencies among other counterparties who hold accounts for the defaulting
party. 120 This, in turn, it is feared, would potentially lead to widespread
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 166 (2012) (mass termination of CDS contracts would be
possible in bankruptcy by the counterparties' ability to invoke ipso facto clauses).
nM See, e.g., TABB, supra note 17, at 854.
112 Lubben, Safe Harbors, supra note 19.
113 Insolvenzordnung [InsO] [German Insolvency Act], Oct. 5, 1994, BGBl. I at 2866, § 21;
Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 147(1) (Eng.).
114 See Jackson, Of Liquidation, supra note 61, at 402.
us See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 546 (e)-(g); H.R. REP. No. 109-31, Pt. 1, at 134 (2005); see also Skeel &
Jackson, supra note 110, at 189.
16 Lubben, Bankruptcy Code, supra note 93, at 131.
n1 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 3, 20, 131-32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88
(justifying 2005 amendments to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as "provisions designed to reduce
systemic risk"); H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583 (invoking
systemic risk to justify the initial exemption for derivatives from automatic stay); see also
Council Directive 2002/47, supra note 55, at 43 (noting that the "Directive has demonstrated the
importance of limiting systemic risk").
118 See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKT., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999); H.R. REP. No. 109-31(1); Lubben,
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 93, at 130.
119 Directive 2002/47 defines close-out netting in art. 2(1)(n) as
a provision of a financial collateral arrangement or of an arrangement of
which a financial collateral arrangement forms part, or, in the absence of any
such provision, any statutory rule by which, on the occurrence of an
enforcement event, whether through the operation of netting or set-off or
otherwise: (i) the obligations of the parties are accelerated so as to be
immediately due and expressed as an obligation to pay an amount. . .; and/or
(ii) an account is taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect
of such obligations, and a net sum equal to the balance of the account is
payable by the party from whom the larger amount is due to the other party.
Council Directive 2002/47, supra note 55, art. 2(1)(n).
120 Memorandum from the Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Inc., on the Implementation of
Netting Legislation: A Guide For Legislators and Other Policy-Makers 4 (Mar. 2006), available
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contagion among non-defaulting counterparties and compromise the overall
integrity of the financial markets. 121 Freeing up illiquid assets otherwise
locked up in bankruptcy, on the other hand, would maintain the liquidity in
the markets by allowing new investments.1 22
3. Consequences
The AIG bail-out may be the best example for the failed assumption that
safe harbors avoid systemic risk. 123 The bail-out of AIG became necessary
because AIG developed a significant liquidity problem after being unable to
post sufficient collateral to ensure meeting its obligations under the majority
of its CDS agreements.124 Under ordinary insolvency rules, AIG could have
sought protection under Chapter 11, but this was not an option. 125 AIG
experienced a run on its collateral by its derivative counterparties and CDS
protection buyers, all of which were protected and were able to grab AIG's
collateral under the safe harbor provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.1 26
The obvious conclusion is that safe harbors did not prevent, but rather
created, systemic risk by encouraging, if not incentivizing, a run on AIG's
derivative positions.127 In fact, the safe harbors triggered a chain reaction of
default in the market. The safe harbors offered derivative counterparties an
unfair advantage over any other creditor in bankruptcy, secured and
unsecured alike. Derivative counterparties, and it seems now also CCPs,128
may foreclose on a debtor's assets without court permission or supervision
and are entirely uninhibited by bankruptcy proceedings. 129 Derivative
contracts may also be set off prior to and after bankruptcy has commenced,
at http://www.isda.org/docproj/pdf/Memo-Model-Netting-Act.pdf; Lynn A. Stout, Why The Law
Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE
L.J. 701, 707 (1999); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 7-8 (1994) (discussing
systemic risk).
121 See, e.g., COLLIER, supra note 95, at 904.
122 Id.
123 See generally Actions Related to AIG, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/
aboutthefedlaig/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2013); see also Shahien Nasiripour, US
Treasury Launches $18bn AIG Offering, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/3b651de8-fadO-11el-b775-00144feabdcO.html.
124 See Kiel, supra note 22; Lubben, Crossroads, supra note 15, at 319-21.
125 Lubben, Crossroads, supra note 15, at 319-21.
126 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (outlining the non-debtor derivative counterparty's right to terminate
contracts to seize collateral); 11 U.S.C. §§ 555-56, 559-61 (stipulating that existing contractual
rights, including ipso facto clauses may be exercised by derivative counterparties).
127 Lubben, Bankruptcy Code, supra note 93, at 125-26; see also Lubben, Safe Harbors, supra
note 19.
128 See infra Part III.C.
129 Lubben, Crossroads, supra note 15, at 322-24.
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and any form of settlement can no longer be avoided under preference law. 130
In addition, all counterparties still have the right to de facto terminate their
credit derivative positions, which is the very right they criticized as
potentially causing systemic risk if exercised by any defaulting
counterparty. 131 More importantly, safe harbors and their use during the
financial crisis prove why the threat of bankruptcy has not functioned as a
deterrent during the crisis. Counterparties simply had no incentive for proper
risk management, knowing that they may grab any collateral without fear of
avoidance before, during, or even after default.
C. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)
In response to the role that CDSs played during the financial crisis, 132 the
EU enacted the EMIR in July 2012. 133 While there is a three-year
transitional period for the regulation's entry into force, the regulation is
directly applicable in all EU Member States. 134
1. Goals and Intentions
The primary goal of the regulation is to increase transparency and reduce
counterparty and operational risk through the use of post-trading market
infrastructure, such as CCPs and trade repositories.1 3 5 The regulation is part
of an international effort to address global concerns about systemic risk and
problems of the OTC derivative markets. 136 At the London and Pittsburgh
G20 summit in 2009, the G20 leaders committed to promote the
standardization of all credit derivative markets in an internationally
coordinated manner. 137 The summit leaders specifically stated that "all
130 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
131 Id.
132 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 92-95 (recognizing the global
dimension of derivative markets and stressing the need for further progress notably on
transparency and stability of derivative markets); see also DE LAROSIERE, supra note 5
(highlighting the risks associated with the rapid explosion of the use of credit derivatives,
stressing the need to address the lack of transparency in the market, and recommending action
to simplify and standardize OTC derivatives and to introduce CCP clearing); Communication
from the Commission: Ensuring Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets, COM (2009) 644
final (July 3, 2009); Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Commission
Communication, SEC (2009) 905 final (July 7, 2009).
133 EMIR, supra note 20.
134 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Sept.
5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 171 ("A regulation shall have general application. It shall be
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.").
135 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 6.
136 See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., EUROPEAN MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE REGUIATION (EMIR)
(2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/whatlinternational/pdflemir.pdf.
137 See G20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System: The London Summit (Apr. 2,
2009), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html; Pittsburgh Summit, supra note
71.
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standardized OTC derivative contracts should be . . . cleared through central
counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be
reported to trade repositories."13 8
As noted above, the OTC derivative market is highly complex, and
contracts are usually negotiated on a bilateral basis between
counterparties.139 As a result, information about the size of the positions and
segments in the OTC market are often not fully known to the public or to
regulators. 140 With the lack of information, effective supervision and proper
risk assessment were essentially impossible during the crisis. 141 To some
degree, CDS protection buyers faced the same dilemma and, without
necessary information, were unable to properly assess the default risk of any
of their counterparties. 142
2. Central Clearing
Under the EMIR, central clearing of all standardized OTC derivatives is
now required throughout the European Union. 143 Generally, through
novation, central clearing "involves inserting a [CCP] between the original
parties to the derivative transaction."144 In other words, a CCP is "the buyer
to every seller and the seller to every buyer." 145 Central clearing of
transactions through a CCP creates two new, perfectly offsetting contracts
and, in turn, may improve liquidity in the market. 146 The clearinghouse
assumes the risk of default of its clearing members, 14 7 thereby eliminating
138 Pittsburgh Summit, supra note 71.
1as CASTAGNINO, supra note 13, at 16.
140 Id.
141 DUFFIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
142 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 14 (arguing that "[b]y its very nature,
the OTC derivative market is opaque. This is because OTC derivatives are privately negotiated
contracts and consequently any information concerning any one of them is usually only available
to the counterparties.").
143 EMIR, supra note 20, art. 1(1).
144 CASTAGNINO, supra note 13, at 15-16; see also, Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and
OTC Derivatives: The Impact of Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives
Market, 44 INT'L LAW. 1077, 1096 (2010).
145 EMIR, supra note 20, art. 2(1).
146 See, e.g., McBride, supra note 144, at 1096.
147 Id. EMIR distinguishes between a clearing member and its client. A 'clearing member' means
an undertaking which participates in a CCP and which is responsible for discharging the
financial obligations arising from that participation." EMIR, supra note 20, art. 2(14). A '"client'
means an undertaking with a contractual relationship with a clearing member of a CCP which
enables that undertaking to clear its transactions with that CCP." Id. art. 2(15).
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the counterparty's risk that it would otherwise maintain under a bilateral
clearing or netting agreement.148
While a CCP assumes the credit risk of all transactions it clears, it
accumulates risk through these transactions and inevitably bears a much
higher default risk in case of its own failure. 149 As a result, a CCP is
effectively a systemically important financial institution, which may pose a
significant threat to financial stability.15 0 At the very minimum, any CCP
failure may lead to a temporary breakdown of the market. This disrupts the
entire system, through which positions are established, maintained, set off,
and closed out. 151 To mitigate this risk, CCPs rely on various reinforcing
mechanisms, also known as the "default waterfall," under EMIR. 152 The first
line of defense is a restriction on membership.153 CCPs may set their own
membership criteria based on creditworthiness and operational capability.154
The membership of any clearing member is contingent upon fulfilling and
maintaining these established standards. 155 The second line of defense
includes various risk management techniques, such as multilateral netting
and imposing collateral requirements.156 If the posted margin or collateral is
not sufficient to offset any losses, the CCP may access default funds
148 CASTAGNINO, supra note 13, at 15; see also Richard Heffner, The Regulation of Multinational
Clearing in the United Kingdom and the United States, in EXCHANGES AND ALTERNATIVE
TRADING SYSTEMS 97, 98-99 (2002) (arguing that the risk only shifts to the CCP after the
contracts become binding).
149 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 64.
150 Id. at 63-65 (the failure becomes a potentially systemic event); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 126 (2012) [hereinafter CPSS-IOSCO
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss1O1a.pdf (defining CCPs as systemically
financial payment systems); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION OF
FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES: CONSULTATIVE REPORT 1 (2012) [hereinafter CPSS-
IOSCO RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss103.pdf (noting
that in some jurisdictions CCPs are systemically important); IMF, World Economic and
Financial Surveys: Summary Version Global Financial Stability Report Meeting New Challenges
to Stability and Building a Safer System, ch. 3 at 2 (2010) [hereinafter IMF Stability Report
2010], available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftugfsr/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf (CCPs
concentrate counterparty and operational risks magnifying the systemic risk related to their own
failure); see also Skeel & Jackson, supra note 110, at 194-95 (arguing that clearing houses are
the new too-big-to-fail entities).
151 CPSS-IOSCO PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 20; CPSS-IOSCO RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION,
supra note 150, at 3-4.
152 EMIR, supra note 20, art. 45.
153 Id. art. 37.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. arts. 39, 41, 46 (segregation and portability; margin requirements; and collateral
requirement, respectively).
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established for this purpose by the defaulting clearing member. 157 As the last
line of defense, the CCP may rely on its own resources and capital. 158 Proper
risk management is further incentivized by the requirement15 9 that a CCP's
own resources must be used first, before the default fund contributions of any
non-defaulting clearing member can be accessed. 160 In addition, margins
posted by non-defaulting clearing members may not be used to cover any
losses. 161
3. Porting
Under EMIR, if a clearing member becomes insolvent and files for
bankruptcy, the positions of the insolvent clearing member's clients held in
client accounts may be transferred directly to another non-defaulting clearing
member. 162 Clients are institutions that have a contractual relationship with
a clearing member of a CCP, allowing them to clear required transactions
through a CCP without being a clearing member. 163 The transfer from the
account of the insolvent member to a so-called back-up clearing member is
called porting. 164 Porting is part of the default procedure of CCPs requiring
strict segregation of clients' funds and prohibiting the pooling of client funds
for distribution. 165 Porting may also be described as a safe harbor for clients
of insolvent clearing members. While client positions may be comparable to
deposits in bank accounts, the sanction of pooling effectively treats clients of
an insolvent clearing member as creditors in a preferential manner compared
to other creditors of the clearing member, including the CCP itself. Clients of
clearing members are sophisticated market participants that either may not
meet the specific membership requirement for CCPs or may have opted not to
157 EMIR, supra note 20, art. 43 (the default fund or funds and other financial resources must "at
all times enable the CCP to withstand the default of at least two clearing members to which it
has the largest exposure under extreme but plausible market conditions").
158 Id. art. 16. The initially required capital is C7.5 million. Id. Furthermore, a CCP's capital
must be proportionate to the risk stemming from its activities and the capital must "at all times
be sufficient to ensure an orderly winding-down or restructuring of the activities over an
appropriate time span and an adequate protection of the CCP against credit, counterparty,
market, operational, legal and business risks . . . ." Id.
159 Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 5, at 64 n. 145.
160 EMIR, supra note 20, art. 45.
161 Id. art. 44(4) ("A CCP shall not use the margins posted by non-defaulting clearing members to
cover the losses resulting from the default of another clearing member.").
162 Id. arts. 39, 48.
163 Id. art. 2.
164 See, e.g., FIN. SERvs. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER CP12/22, CLIENT ASSETS REGIME: EMIR,
MULTIPLE POOLS AND THE WIDER REVIEW 5 (2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
static/pubs/cp/cpl2-22.pdf.
165 Id. at 6.
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become a clearing member. 166 As such, they should also be obligated to
practice proper risk management, which is not encouraged through porting.
Creating safe harbors for clients of clearing members may therefore diminish
the overall benefit of clearing OTC derivatives through a system of CCPs.
This seems even more important when taking into account that the transfer
to a back-up clearing member requires that clearing member's consent. 167
III. EUROPEAN BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
In June 2012, the European Commission proposed a directive
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions
and investment firms in Europe. 168 The directive is part of a larger
Commission initiative to establish a comprehensive EU-wide crisis
prevention framework for troubled banks, and it attempts to harmonize
different insolvency regimes throughout the EU. 169 The framework is based
on seven major objectives, 170 which the Commission initially outlined in an
October 2010 communication, 171 which a consultation paper published in
early 2011 later detailed. 172 Other regulatory reforms 173 include the revised
capital requirements under the Capital Requirements Directive ("CRD")
16 See, e.g., EMIR, supra note 20, art. 2(15) (defining client as an undertaking involving a
contractual relationship with a clearing member of a CCP); EUR. MKTS. AND SEC. AGENCY, FINAL
REPORT: DRAFT TECHNICAL STANDARDS UNDER REGULATION (EU) No. 648/2012 OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 4 JULY 2012 ON OTC DERIVATIVES, CCPS, AND
TRADE REPOSITORIES 8-10, available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2012-600 0.pdf
(discussing the need for direct and indirect client clearing); Goldman Sachs Int'l, Comments to
ESMA Discussion Paper on OTC Derivatives and CCPs 1-2, available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/goldman-sachsinternational-comments-to_esma dp-o
n otcderivatives-andscps.pdf (noting that many counterparties which are subject to a clearing
obligation may be unwilling or unsuitable to become direct clearing members).
167 EMIR, supra note 20, art. 48(5)-(6).
168 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7.
169 DG Internal Market and Services Working Document: Technical Details of a Possible EU
Framework for Bank Recovery and Resolution 7-9 (2011) [hereinafter DG Internal Market and
Services], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/consultations/docs/201 1/crisis_
management/consultation-paper en.pdf.
170 The seven objectives are (1) put prevention and preparations first, (2) provide credible
resolution tools, (3) enable fast and decisive action, (4) reduce moral hazard, (5) contribute to a
smooth resolution of cross-border groups, (6) ensure legal certainty, and (7) limit distortions of
competition. Communication from the Commission: An EU Framework for Crisis Management in
the Financial Sector, at 3-4, COM (2010) 579 final (Oct. 10, 2010).
171 Id.
172 See DG Internal Market and Services, supra note 169.
173 For a more detailed discussion of some of these changes, see Wulf A. Kaal & Christoph K.
Henkel, Contingent Captial with Sequential Triggers, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221 (2012)
(distinguishing between short- and long-term initiatives).
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IV, 174 the EMIR, 175 and a new proposal intended to amend the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).176
The proposed European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive177 may
be considered the core structural element of the future EU crisis prevention
framework. Concluding that normal insolvency proceedings may not always
be "apt to deal efficiently with the failure of financial institutions,"178 the
proposal establishes a special insolvency regime for credit institutions 179 and
investment firms. 180 The main objectives are preparation, recovery, and
resolution, 181 with a specific focus aimed at preventing any escalation of
problems for financial markets during a crisis, and reducing the risk of actual
bank failures. 182 Most noteworthy, the Commission proposal links bank
recovery and resolution directly with the CRD, the EMIR, and the MiFID.183
This Article argues that despite the fundamental importance of the
Commission Proposal, the Proposal may not sufficiently integrate the
objectives of prevention and preparation with those of the EMIR. Exempting
CCPs under the proposed resolution regime may instead renew the risk
associated with OTC derivatives and CDSs by failing to incentivize CCPs for
performing their risk management properly. Exemptions in the proposed
directive create new safe harbors for CCPs and indirectly for non-defaulting
derivative counterparties. As a result, the Commission Proposal may
promote, rather than prevent, excessive risk taking. In fact, the exemptions
for CCPs may encourage counterparties' belief that they no longer need to
worry about default since a CCP will clear their derivative obligations and
may allow close-out obligations in a manner not much different from that
174 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Prudential
Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, at 10, COM (2011) 452 final (July 20,
2011); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Access to the
Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and
Investment Firms, at 2-13, COM (2011) 453 final (July 20, 2011).
175 EMIR, supra note 20.
176 See generally Council Directive 2008/10, 2008 O.J. (L 76) 33 (EC).
177 See generally Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7.
178 Id. at 5.
179 Id.; Council Directive 2006/48, art. 4(1), 2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 (EC).
180 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, arts. 1, 2; Council Directive
2006/49/EC, art. 3(1)(b), 2006 O.J. (C 177) 201 (EC). It may also apply to financial institutions as
defined in art. 4(5) of Directive 2006/48/EC and various types of financial holding companies,
subsidiaries, and parent undertakings. See Commission Proposal for European Bank Resolution,
supra note 7, at 41-60.
1s1 Commission Proposal for European Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 8; see also Commission
Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, at 8 (2010) [hereinafter Staff Working
Document].
182 Staff Working Document, supra note 181, at 9, 49-58.
1sa See, e.g., id. at 3.
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available before the financial crisis. The only difference made by the
Commission Proposal is that the systemic risk associated with derivatives
shifted from counterparties to CCPs, which fails to improve risk management
in reality.
A. Proposed Recovery and Resolution Tools
Before going into more detail on the temporary suspension of termination
rights of credit derivatives and swap agreements, it is necessary to discuss
the new recovery and resolution tools for banks proposed by the Commission.
This is even more important, as some of these tools directly include safe
harbors for derivatives, repurchase agreements, and swaps.184 It is beyond
the scope of this Article to discuss all of the recovery and resolution powers in
broad detail, but a more general overview may suffice to contextualize the
temporary suspension of rights in the proposal. It is also important that the
Commission Proposal establishes only a minimum set of resolution tools and
powers. Member States will generally be permitted to retain additional tools
and powers, including more stringent intervention powers, as long as they
are compatible with the objectives of the EU resolution framework. 185 Ring
fencing of financial institutions as a preventative measure will not be allowed
in this context, however. 186 The Commission explicitly finds ring fencing to be
incompatible with the objectives of the proposal. 187
1. Resolution Plans and General Principles
Similar to the Dodd-Frank Act, 188 the proposal would require credit
institutions and investment firms to draw up recovery plans. 189 The plans
should set out arrangements and measures enabling them to restore their
long-term viability should their financial situation deteriorate. 9 0 The goal of
these recovery plans is to minimize taxpayer exposure to bank losses while
protecting the financial markets.191 The recovery plans are also intended to
allow resolution authorities to determine whether recovery is feasible and to
initiate additional measures if necessary. 192 Such measures may include
requiring changes to the legal or operational structure of a bank, separating
184 See infra Part II.B.2.
18s Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 12-13.
186 See, e.g., INDEP. COMM. ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT: CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS 7
(2011), available at http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf.
187 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 12 n.15.
188 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111-203, §
165(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1426 (2010).
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deposit taking and investment functions, restricting certain activities, and
requiring the issuance of additional convertible capital instruments. 193 The
Commission further established a set of specific principles for the allocation
of losses that apply to all resolution tools. First, while the principle of "no
creditor worse off' generally applies, losses should first be allocated to the
shareholders in full and, then, to the creditors. 194 Second, creditors of the
same class may be treated differently if it is justified by public interest and if
it is considered necessary to ensure financial stability. 195
2. Resolution Tools and Powers
a. Asset Sale and Transfer
The Commission proposal includes four general resolution tools: the sale-
of-business, the bridge institution, the asset-separation, and the bail-in
tool. 196 Shareholder consent is not required for any of these actions, and
procedural requirements established under applicable company or securities
law may be disregarded for the purposes of the asset sale and transfer of an
institution in resolution. 197
The sale-of-business tool allows the resolution authority to sell the
financial institution under resolution as a whole or in part.19 8 Specifically, the
resolution authority has the power to transfer shares or other instruments of
ownership; transfer all or specified assets, rights, or liabilities; or transfer
any combination of some or all assets, rights, and liabilities of an institution
under resolution. 199 Proceeds of a partial transfer must "benefit the
institution under resolution," and if all shares, "instruments of ownership," or
assets were transferred, proceeds must "benefit the shareholders who have
been divested of their rights." 200 The sale of any of the assets should be
marketed without discrimination 201 and cannot be transferred to any bridge
institution. 202
A bridge institution is a temporary institution with the purpose of
facilitating the sale of the business to a private sector purchaser when
193 Id. at 9-10.
194 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 11.
19s Id.
196 Id. at 12.
197 Id. art. 32(1).
198 Id.
199 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 32(1)(a)-(c).
200 Id. art. 32(1)(3).
201 Id. art. 33(2)(b).
202 Id. art. 32(1).
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market conditions are appropriate. 203 Similar to the sale-of-business tool, the
resolution authority may transfer all or part of the business of an institution
in resolution to a bridge institution.204 Following the transfer to the bridge
institution, the asset sale to the private sector may be achieved by selling
part of the bridge institution's assets or the bridge institution itself. 205
Operation of the bridge institution is terminated if the institution merges
with another institution, the majority of the bridge institution's capital is
acquired by a third party, a substantial number of its assets are assumed by
another person, 206 or at the end of a two-year period following the date on
which the last transfer form an institution under resolution was made. 207 The
bridge institution must be a publicly controlled entity and must fulfill all
capital requirements under the CRD. 208 Shareholders or creditors, whose
property, rights, or liabilities were not transferred, have no claim against the
bridge institution. 209
The asset-separation tool allows the resolution authority to transfer
assets to a management vehicle. 210 As the bridge institution, the
management vehicle shall be owned by at least one public authority, which
may include the resolution authority. 211 Similar to a "bad bank," 212 the
purpose of the asset-separation tool is to transfer impaired or problem assets
from an institution in resolution to a management vehicle and if these assets
are of "such a nature that the liquidation of those assets under normal
insolvency proceedings could have an adverse effect on the financial
market."213 Over time, such problem assets may be managed and worked out
by the management vehicle.
203 Id. at 11.
204 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 34(1).
205 Id. art. 35(3).
206 Id.
207 Id. art. 35(5).
208 Id. art. 35.
209 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 34(9).
210 Id. art. 36(1).
211 Id. art. 36(2).
212 See, e.g., Raphael Minder, Spain Approves Establishment of 'Bad Bank,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/0lfbusiness/globallspain-approves-establishment-of-bad-
bank.html?_r=O; James Wilson, German 'Bad Bank' in Greek Debt Swap, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/adO2c288-d56b-11eO-bd7e-00144feab49a.html#axzz27mC
91f00.
213 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 36(4).
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b. The Bail-In Tool
The bail-in tool may be the most important resolution tool introduced by
the Commission. 214 It is a conversion tool allowing resolution authorities to
write down unsecured debt and convert that debt into equity. 215 The primary
purpose of a bail-in is to restructure a failing financial institution to
recapitalize "an institution that meets the conditions for resolution." 216 The
bail-in tool may generally be applied to all liabilities, 217 but excludes secured
liabilities, covered deposits, and liabilities with an original maturity of less
than one month. 218 In addition to the safe harbor protection, national
regulatory authorities may also exempt derivatives that fall under "liabilities
with an original maturity of less than one month,"219 if determined necessary
to ensure the critical operations of a financial institution or in order to avoid
adverse effects on financial stability, in general. 220 The Commission may,
however, limit resolution authority discretion by adopting delegated acts in
the future and specifying when exclusion is necessary or appropriate. 221 The
factors the Commission may consider in this context are the systemic impact
of closing-out derivative positions, the effect on CCPs and their clearing
214 See id. arts. 37-51. In addition to the bail-in resolution tool, the Commission proposal also
introduced a write-down tool for capital instruments, which must be distinguished from those
discussed here. Id. arts. 51-55.
215 See id. art. 37.
216 Id. art. 37(2)(a).
217 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 38(1).
218 Id. art. 38(2).
219 Id. art. 38(2)(d). Of specific interest is the fact that the Commission refers to "residual
maturity" in its explanatory memorandum, noting that "there are, however some liabilities that
would be excluded ex-ante . . . such as secured liabilities, covered deposits and liabilities with a
residual maturity of less than one month." Id. at 13 (emphasis added). However, the actual text of
the proposed directive under article 38(2)(d) refers to "liabilities with an original maturity of less
than one month." Id. art. 38(2)(a) (emphasis added). Both are different maturities. Original
maturity is the period from the issue date until the final contractually scheduled payment,
whereas remaining or residual maturity refers to the period from the reference date of a debt
security until the final contractually scheduled payment. See, e.g., IMF, Handbook on Securities
Statistics, Part 1: Debt Securities Issues 38 (2009), available at
www.imf.org/external/nplstalwgsd/pdf/051309.pdf.
220 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 38(3) ("Where resolution
authorities apply the bail-in tool, they may exclude from the application of the write-down and
conversion powers liabilities arising from derivatives that do not fall within the scope of point (d)
of paragraph 2, if that exclusion is necessary or appropriate to achieve the objectives specified in
points (a) and (b) of Article 26(2)."). In Article 38(2)(d), the proposal includes a safe harbor for
"liabilities with an original maturity of less than one month." Id. art. 38(2)(d). Article 26(2)
stipulates that one of the resolution objectives under the proposal is "(a) to ensure the continuity
of critical functions" and "(b) to avoid significant adverse effects on financial stability, including
by preventing contagion, and maintaining market discipline." Id. art. 26(2).
221 Id. art. 38(4).
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activities, and the effect on risk management of counterparties to derivatives,
in general. 222
Bail-in requires a sufficient amount of bail-inable liabilities, in order to
achieve the objective of recapitalization. The Commission proposal suggests
that the minimum aggregate amount "will be proportionate and adapted for
each category of institutions on the basis of their risk or the composition of its
sources of funding."223 The Commission further suggests that, based on the
"evidence from the recent financial crisis and of performed model
simulations, an appropriate percentage of total liabilities that could be
subject to bail-in could equal to ten percent of total liabilities (excluding
regulatory capital)." 224
Finally, the bail-in tool also establishes its own priority of claims. 225
Shareholder claims should be written down first, 226 followed by subordinate
debt holders in second place 227 and senior debt holders only if the total
reduction of liabilities is less than the aggregated amount after that. 228
Within the same rank, losses are allocated equally between liabilities by
reducing the principal amount or outstanding amount payable pro rata to
their value. 229
222 The proposal provides:
4. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts adopted in
accordance with Article 103 in order to specify further:
(a) specific classes of liabilities covered by point (d) of paragraph 2,
and.
(b) the circumstances when exclusion is necessary or appropriate to
achieve the objectives specified in points (a) and (b) of Article 26(2),
having regard to the following factors:
(i) the systemic impact of closing out derivative positions
in order to apply the debt write-down tool;
(ii) the effect on the operation of a Central Counterparty
of applying the debt write-down tool to liabilities arising
from derivatives that are cleared by the Central
Counterparty; and
(iii) the effect of applying the debt write-down tool to
liabilities arising from derivatives on the risk
management of counterparties to those derivatives.
Id. art. 38(4)(a)-(b)(i)-(iii).
223 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 13.
224 Id.; see also id. art. 39(3).
225 Id. art. 43.
226 Id. art. 43(1)(a).
227 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 43(1)(b)-(c).
228 Id. art. 43(1)(d).
229 Id. art. 43(2).
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B. Suspension of Termination Rights and Netting out
The Commission proposal establishes a temporary suspension of
contractual termination rights for financial contracts. 230 While not providing
for an automatic stay, the power to temporarily suspend termination rights of
derivatives and other financial contractS231 is similar to § 5390(c)(8)(F)(ii) of
the Dodd-Frank Act 232 and clearly draws on the "Key Attributes" published
by the FSB.233 Resolution authorities are provided with the power to impose a
temporary stay on the exercise of rights by creditors and counterparties to
enforce claims and close-out, declare default, accelerate, or otherwise
terminate contracts with a failing institution solely by reason of an action
taken by the resolution authority. 234 The temporary suspension is viewed as
an essential tool to providing the resolution authority with "a period of time
to identify and value those contracts that need to be transferred to a solvent
third party"235 and avoids the risk of rapidly changing values resulting from a
run on the assets of a failing financial institution.2 3 6 The temporary stay is
short and may not last longer than until 5 PM of the next business day.2 3 7
During the stay, the resolution authority is required to "make all reasonable
efforts to ensure that all margin, collateral and settlement obligations" are
met. 238 After the end of the stay, existing termination rights resume, but only
for those counterparties whose contractual obligations remain with the
institution in resolution. 239 A temporary stay with a suspension of
termination rights is not available if financial contracts are linked through a
master or netting agreement and if only part of the rights and liabilities
230 Id. arts. 61-63.
231 Financial contracts include securities contracts, commodities contracts, futures, forwards,
options, and repurchase agreements relating to securities, swap agreements, and master
agreements for any of these contracts. See id. art. 63(6)(a)-(f).
232 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)(F)(ii)
(2010).
233 While drawing on the "Key Attributes," the Commission did not explicitly include an
exemption for CCPs. The FSB specifically stated that
[riesolution authorities should have at their disposal a broad range of
resolution powers, which should include powers to do the following: ...
(xi) Impose a moratorium with a suspension of payments to
unsecured creditors and customers (except for payments and
property transfers to central counterparties (CCPs) and those
entered into a payment, clearing and settlement system[s]) ....
See FSB, KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 73, art. 3.2(xi).
234 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 63(1).
235 Id. at 14; see also DG Internal Market and Services, supra note 169, at 64.
236 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 14.
237 Id. art. 63(1).
238 Id. art. 63(2).
239 Id. art. 63(4)(a).
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under that agreement are being transferred. 240 Generally, under a partial
property transfer, all linked agreements must be transferred together,
including "set-off arrangements, title transfer financial collateral
arrangements, security . . . and structured finance arrangements." 241
Whether this safeguard also applies to CCPs is unclear. Complex netting and
set-off arrangements may not only be part of the general clearing procedure
of CCPs, each CCP may also be a direct party to a netting and set-off
arrangement with each of their clearing members. 242 It is further noteworthy
that, in the context of the enforcement of security interests of secured
creditors, the Commission proposal includes an explicit exemption for CCPs
from a temporary suspension. 243 Under the proposal, resolution authorities
have the power to restrict, for a limited period, secured creditors from
enforcing "security interests in relation to any assets of' the financial
institution under resolution. 244 The term "limited period" is not defined, but
remains in the discretion of the resolution authority. As a result, the
definition of the time period may depend on what the respective resolution
authority determines to be necessary in achieving its resolution objective.245
C. Exceptions for Derivatives and Central Counterparties
The European Commission Proposal for a Directive Establishing a
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and
Investment Firms includes many improvements, but also expands safe
harbors for derivative and financial agreements under the proposal's
resolution regime. 246 The proposed framework is a specialty resolution
regime for banks directly addressing shortcomings in EU Member State
insolvency regimes when dealing with failing financial institutions. 247 The
240 Id. arts. 65, 68(2)(d).
241 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, at 14; see also DG Internal Market
and Services, supra note 169, at 69-74.
242 See, e.g., Sixteenth Meeting of the IMF Committee on Balance of Payment Statistics,
Washington, D.C., Dec. 1-5, 2003, Developments in Market Clearing and Settlement
Arrangements: Some Balance Sheet Recognition and Measurement Issues, at 2, BOPCOM-03/13
(noting the scope of CCP clearing is to maximize netting through a single legal set-off), available
at http://www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ft/bop/2003/03-13.pdf- IMF Stability Report 2010, supra note
150, at 2 (the primary advantage of CCP clearing is its ability to reduce systemic risk through
multilateral netting); Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 64 ("[T]he 'many-to-
many' chain of credit is replaced by [sic] 'one-to-many' arrangement.").
243 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 62(2).
244 Id.
245 See id. art. 62(3)-(4).
246 See generally id.
247 Id. at 4; see also Final Report to the European Commission on Pre-Insolvency-Early
Intervention-Reorganization-Liquidation, at 3-12, (Nov. 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/bank/docs/windingup/200911/final report200911_en.pdf;
Final Report to the European Commission Concerning a Study on the Feasibility of Reducing
Obstacles to the Transfer of Assets Within a Cross Border Banking Group During a Financial
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resolution tools proposed are significant-they would harmonize and clarify
many aspects of insolvency law throughout the Union. 248 For example, the
proposal includes a clear ipso facto clause according to which "the resolution
action shall in itself not make it possible for anyone to . . . exercise any right
or power to terminate, accelerate or declare a default or credit event under
any contract or agreement to which the institution under resolution is a
party."249 At the same time, "liabilities with an original maturity of less than
one month" are exempt from the scope of the bail-in tool. 250 Even more
significantly, national resolution authorities are granted the power to
"exclude from the application of the write-down and conversion powers
liabilities arising from derivatives" 251 if determined necessary "to ensure the
continuity of critical functionS"252 and "to avoid significant adverse effects on
financial stability, including by preventing contagion, and maintaining
market discipline."253 While these are already broad safeguards for financial
contracts which may lead to significant regulatory differences among the
Member States, the Commission has also proposed that it may be given the
authority to further extend safeguards for financial contracts by delegated
act.254 The Commission has broad powers to do so not only with regard to
bilateral counterparties, but also with regard to CCPs. 255
A CCP's powers to realize assets or foreclose on collateral are also exempt
from any limited suspension during the resolution phase of a financial
institution, 256 which may not prevent a "grab race," such as that experienced
by AIG or Lehman Brothers. 257 The only difference from AIG and Lehman
Brothers in 2008 may be the fact that under the European Commission
proposal, central (but not bilateral) counterparties will try to realize their
assets and commence a run on the assets of the financial institution under
resolution. Finally, the resolution proposal broadly follows other national and
Crisis, at 5-7 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/
bank/docs/windingup/200908/final report20091218_en.pdf.
248 See, e.g., Thomas M.J. Mollers, Dominique Christ & Andreas Harrer, Nationale Alleingeinge
und die europdische Reaktion auf ein Verbot ungedeckter Leerverkdufe, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 1167-71 (2010) (Ger.).
249 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, arts. 57(5)(a), 63(4)(a)(i).
250 Id. art. 38(2)(d).
251 Id. art. 38(3).
252 Id. art. 26(2)(a).
253 Id. art. 26(2)(b).
254 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 38(4)(a).
255 See id. art. 38(4)(b)(i)-(iii).
256 Id. art. 62(2).
257 See, e.g., Stephan Madaus, Das Insolvenzverfahren der Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. - e in.
jeder Hinsicht besonderes Reorganisationverfahren, NEU ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INSOLVENZRECHT 715-
16 (2008) (Ger.).
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international initiatives, such as Dodd-Frank 258 in the United States, in
allowing the temporary suspension of termination rights. 259 However, a
temporary suspension of termination rights is not available if the resolution
authority decides that it does not want to transfer all of the assets under a
netting arrangement to a private sector purchaser or a bridge institution.
Netting and master agreements, which are typically the norm in OTC
derivative documentation, 260 are therefore guaranteed at least a partial
safeguard, and cherry picking is not permitted. 261 Netting and master
agreements may also be the norm between clearing members and CCPs if
central clearing of standardized OTC derivative contracts becomes the
international norm. It is highly questionable whether all derivative positions
under a master agreement between a clearing house and a defaulting
clearing member will ever be capable of anything but a partial transfer,
thereby inevitably undermining the effect of any temporary suspension of
termination rights or any temporary stay.
IV. CONCLUSION
Derivatives are essential financial instruments in international finance
and will continue to play this role in the future. Derivatives, and specifically
CDSs, are also highly complex financial instruments posing significant risk
to financial markets. However, despite best efforts by financial institutions
and regulators, this risk may never be entirely manageable. At the same
time, a better, more efficient recovery and resolution system need not be an
even more complex regulatory and crisis management framework. Indeed,
one may ask: may something be learned from a dog catching a Frisbee? 262
Complex decision-making is simple. 263
The European Commission's proposal for a directive on bank recovery
and resolution will be essential in ensuring the stability of financial markets
258 12 U.S.C. § 53 (2012).
259 Commission Proposal for Bank Resolution, supra note 7, art. 63.
260 See, e.g., Binder, supra note 18, at 16; see also CASTAGNINO, supra note 13, at 184-85;
HARDING, supra note 30, at 20.
261 This is not to disregard a creditor's general right to set off mutual obligations or possible
recoupment rights. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012). However, some of these obligations may
have been incurred within 90 days before the date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition or simply
for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(3). In addition, if porting
is permitted, many of these claims may qualify as transfers by an entity other than the debtor
after the commencement of the case or 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). If claims are ported, the mutuality of claims may also be questionable.
Mutuality is meant to protect against triangular setoffs and requires that each party owns its
claim with the right to collect the claim in their own name. See, e.g., COLLIER, supra note 95, at
617. Finally, recoupment rights should only be available if they arise from the same transaction.
See, e.g., In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting this requirement). For a less
restrictive view, see Skeel & Jackson, supra note 110, at 188.
262 Haldane & Mandoures, supra note 14.
263 See id.
112 [Vol. 22:81
EUROPEAN UNION: STATUS Quo OF SAFE HARBORS
in Europe by creating a harmonized resolution framework. While, on the one
hand, instituting a stay and a temporary suspension of termination rights, as
well as an asset transfer tool not unlike the option to resume obligations
under preference law, the Commission proposal expands safe harbors for
financial contracts in other areas and creates a complicated network of
exceptions. These exceptions undermine the best efforts of bilateral risk
management, especially in the context of central clearing of OTC derivatives.
Safe harbors reduce the incentive of CCPs to monitor their members. 264
Without any counterparty risk and the ability to always realize their assets,
CCPs have no incentive to reduce systemic risk.2 6 5 The expansion of safe
harbors under the current Commission proposal may allow a CCP "to remove
itself from the middle of trades." 266 However, this does not take the objectives
of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation into account and may run
counter to its goals. The European clearing industry is already calling for a
further expansion of safe harbors.267 The reasoning is not new-safe harbors
are viewed as being "crucial for the stability of the financial systems as a
whole."268 However, this view is shortsighted. The EU should not continue to
expand safe harbors, but should rather ensure that derivative counterparties
retain a certain degree of counterparty risk in the form of a real and
enforceable bankruptcy threat.
264 See, e.g., Lubben, Bankruptcy Code, supra note 93, at 134.
265 See id.
266 Id.
267 See, e.g., Comment from the Eur. Ass'n of CCP Clearing Houses on the Proposal for a
Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution 1-2 (July 25, 2012), available at
http://www.eachorg.eu/eachl/cm/.
268 Id. at 2.
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